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AVOIDING TAX AVOIDANCE: A RATIONAL PROPOSAL TO CLOSE
EXISTING LOOPHOLES IN THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
Davide Proietti∗

I like to pay taxes. With them, I buy civilization. —Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr.
INTRODUCTION
Today, few people share Justice Holmes’ feelings about taxes. April
15 is a date when the feelings, needs, and desires of different citizens clash.
It is a dreaded deadline for most taxpayers, especially those with a large
taxable income (wealthy individuals and large corporations); other
taxpayers wait at the edge of their seats for a refund; accountants rejoice as
old and new clients knock at their doors to prepare the due filings; and the
IRS oversees this frantic activity ensuring compliance with the law, proper
reporting, and emanating an aura of holy terror. However, there is one
motive common to all taxpayers; whether in the form of maximizing a
refund or minimizing a tax liability, everyone wants to keep as much money
in his or her own pockets as the law permits. But what exactly does the law
permit?
The Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) is long and complex, it contains
many exemptions, exclusions, and exceptions, which are typically not
within the understanding of the general public. The “income defense
industry,”1 a class of highly specialized lawyers and accountants, dispenses
its knowledge on tax-minimization and tax-avoidance to the few chosen
ones who can afford it, such as wealthy individuals and, most often, large
corporations. Why are corporations the most frequent clients of the income
defense industry, and why is that a problem?
Corporations in the United States are “persons” in the legal sense:
entities that the law treats as individuals for purposes of doing business,
assessing liability and, obviously, for tax purposes.2 Certain corporations

∗ Davide Proietti, J.D. candidate May 2017, Florida International University College of Law. I would
like to thank Prof. Gabilondo for his assistance in reviewing this comment. Additionally, a special thank
you is due to the incredible people of the FIU LAW REVIEW. It is because of your passion and relentless
efforts this law journal is the quality publication that it is.
1
Jeffrey Winters, America’s Income Defense Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:21
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-winters/americas-income-defense-i_b_772723.html.
2
See generally 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864 (1921) (describing the limitation of liability of
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today reach titanic dimensions; hiring hundreds of thousands of employees,
managing thousands of subsidiaries, and booking multi-billion dollar
income statements. The scale of operation of these corporate giants is
exemplified by companies like Wal-Mart, which recorded sales of $476
billion in 2014; and Exxon Mobil, whose sales were just shy of $400
billion.3 Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobil’s tax expenses, as reported in their
income statements, were approximately $8 billion for Wal-Mart, and $18
billion for Exxon Mobil.4 These corporate behemoths have a tri-fold
advantage in employing the services of the income defense industry. First,
they have the economic resources to access the best and brightest minds in
the industry. Second, they have the pressing need to reduce their gigantic
tax liabilities. Third, they have a world-wide presence that allows these
large multinationals to exploit complex schemes of profit shifting, tax
deferrals, transfer pricing, and other techniques described in more detail in
later sections of this article.
This explains why corporations have a particularly strong incentive to
take advantage of the income defense industry; but why is that a problem?
Is it not a legitimate interest of every citizen, whether a corporation or an
individual, to reduce its tax burden within the limits of the law?5 Certainly;
but, just like any other right, it should be punishable when abused. The
think tank Citizens for Tax Justice published a report in February 2014,
which examined the tax reporting practices of the top tax-dodgers of
corporate America.6 The report analyzed the 2008–12 period and showed
that the average tax rate for 288 profitable, large, U.S. corporations was
approximately 19.4% over the five years of the study.7 Further, twenty-six
corporations, including giants like General Electric, Boeing, Verizon, and
Yahoo!, paid no federal income tax for the period analyzed in the report.8
It is objective and undeniable (even from a cursory reading of the
statistics provided in the previous paragraph) that there are imperfections
and contradictions in the I.R.C. that need to be addressed.9 This article

corporate entities and their attributes of standing and “legal persona” separate from its owners and/or
administrators).
3
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Mar. 21, 2014); Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 25, 2015).
4
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Mar. 21, 2014); Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 25, 2015).
5
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
6
See generally ROBERT S. MCINTYRE ET AL., THE SORRY STATE OF CORPORATE TAXES (2014),
http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id. at 4.
9
Specifically, this article will discuss 26 C.F.R. Sections 1.482, 1.83-7 (2016), and I.R.C.
Section 83 (West 2016).
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neither seeks to develop a utopian socialism, nor does it aim at impinging
on the free market tradition of the United States. The purpose of this article
is to underline the intrinsic contradictions and inefficiencies of the I.R.C.,
particularly regarding those provisions that allow corporate entities to
substantially reduce their effective tax rate to a rate comparable to small and
middle enterprises.
This article will further propose statutory language designed to close
existing tax “loopholes” and to improve the equality of the tax system, thus
improving the current state of affairs. In the next section, this article will
analyze why and how excessive corporate tax avoidance creates inequality
throughout the tax system. Then, this article will focus on the current state
of affairs, discussing first the different tax statuses among business entities,
and then the specific methods employed by corporations to reduce their
income tax. Lastly, this article will suggest proposed reforms to be applied
to the existing tax provisions with the objective of mitigating or eliminating
the unfairness described in the earlier paragraphs.
WHAT IS FAIR AND WHAT IS NOT
For most, the fact that multi-billion dollar corporations do not pay
income taxes is startling and produces strong feelings of inequity and
unfairness. However, equity and fairness are more than just a general “gut”
feeling; they comprise several dimensions. Given the complexity of the tax
system, it is almost an impossible task to properly balance all of the
different layers of the multi-faceted idea of “fairness” in order to produce a
perfect tax code.
While an in-depth discussion on the ideals of fairness and justice is
beyond the scope of this article, it is certainly important to mention that the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has identified seven
different “dimensions” of equity and fairness with respect to tax policy,
which provide a useful framework of analysis to determine when and how
specific tax provisions affect the fairness of the overall tax system.
1. Exchange Equity and Fairness – Over the long run
taxpayers receive appropriate value for the taxes they
pay.
2. Process Equity and Fairness – Taxpayers have a voice
in the tax system, are given due process, and are treated
with respect by tax administrators.
3. Horizontal Equity and Fairness – Similarly situated
taxpayers are taxed similarly.
4. Vertical Equity and Fairness – Taxes are based on the
ability to pay.
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5. Time-Related Equity and Fairness – Taxes are not
unduly distorted when income or wealth levels
fluctuate over time.
6. Inter-Group Equity and Fairness – No group of
taxpayers is favored to the detriment of another without
good cause.
7. Compliance Equity and Fairness – All taxpayers pay
what they owe on a timely basis.10
Excessive tax avoidance is problematic because it hinders the fairness
and administrability of the tax system at different levels.
First, certain tax provisions encourage the movement of money
towards less socially-desirable investments, thus creating a problem of
exchange equity and fairness.11 The tax consequences of business decisions
play an important role in the decision-making process itself, from both a
management and investment perspective. The tax implications of business
decisions have created three major distortions in the U.S. economy: (1) a
preference towards non-corporate business entities; (2) a preference towards
debt financing of corporations and excessive leverage; and (3) a preference
towards earnings retention, rather than distribution, to avoid the double
taxation of corporate income.12 Further, the current nominal corporate tax
rate in the United States, which is one of the highest among Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries,13
creates an incentive to shift capital towards different, less tax-burdened
investments, such as unproductive real estate14 and investment abroad.15
Second, excessive tax avoidance creates differences among taxpayers
with a similar taxable income but different access to professionals in the
income defense industry, which is a problem of horizontal equity and
fairness as well as inter-group equity and fairness.16 For example, let us

10

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (“AICPA”), GUIDING PRINCIPLES
ed. 2007).

FOR TAX EQUITY AND FAIRNESS 3 (4th
11
Id.

12
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS:
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE vii (1992).
13 Corporate Income Tax Rate, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://stats.oecd.org//In
dex.aspx?QueryId=58204# (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
14
Real Estate Investment Trusts, for example, are not subject to corporate income tax, provided
that they comply with certain ownership, operational, and distribution requirements. I.R.C. § 857 (West
2016).
15
Countries like Bermuda, Jersey, the Isle of Man, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and the
British Virgin Islands have a statutory 0% corporate income tax. Kyle Pomerleau, Corporate Income
Tax Rates Around the World, 2014, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
corporate-income-tax-rates-around-world-2014.
16
AICPA, supra note 10.
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assume that two corporations have exactly the same income. One
corporation may end up with a larger tax bill than the other because it
allocated more resources towards tax avoidance, electing to use more
skilled tax attorneys and accountants.
One may argue that this is not a problem at all, but rather the mere
result of free will. A corporation chooses a better accountant to reduce its
tax liability like an individual may choose a better doctor to treat an illness.
However, this argument is not entirely correct because not everybody may
need to treat an illness every year, but every corporation does need to pay
taxes every year. The incidence of illnesses, which creates a market for
doctors, is random; whereas the incidence of taxes is defined by law, and
imposed by the government on the entity. Because the government imposes
a duty upon the taxpayers, the government also has the responsibility of
ensuring the fairness of the tax reporting process of similarly-situated
taxpayers.
Third, excessive tax avoidance defeats the purpose of a progressive tax
system––vertical equity17––because it concentrates the highest effective tax
rates on the “middle” earners. This concentration of the tax burden can be
easily visualized by analyzing historical corporate tax return data. The IRS
periodically publishes statistical data summaries for the tax receipts of
previous years.18 The year 2012 was analyzed to show how tax avoidance
affects vertical equity. The table selected for the analysis shows income tax
receipts of corporations by size of taxable income.19 Using data from the
table, the effective tax rate by taxable income was calculated, dividing the
total income tax after credits, by the income subject to tax, for each of the
taxable income brackets reported in the dataset. The results are summarized
in Table 1 below.

17

Id.
SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Data by Size, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/
SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Data-by-Size#_bm2# (last updated Jan. 6, 2015).
19 SOI Tax Stats - Returns of Active Corporations, Other Than Forms 1120S, 1120-REIT, and
1120-RIC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Table-22-Returns-ofActive-Corporations,-Other-Than-Forms-1120S,-1120-REIT,-and-1120-RIC (last updated May 25,
2016).
18
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From Table 1, it is easy to identify that the effective tax rate across the
various classes of taxable income follows a shape closer to a bell curve,
rather than an ideal positive-slope line. The highest effective tax rate falls
on corporations with a taxable income between $100,000 and $500,000.
On the other hand, corporations with over $100 million in taxable income
have a lower effective tax rate than corporations with $25,000 to $50,000 in
taxable income.
Lastly, from an administrative standpoint, excessive tax-avoidance
creates inefficiencies within the tax system, both for the taxpayer and for
the IRS, which is a problem of compliance equity and fairness.20 The
taxpayer has an interest in allocating resources towards tax-avoidance,
therefore reducing the amount of resources available for otherwise
productive investments, while the IRS collects less taxes than it should
(because of the effective tax-dodging) and faces rising costs of enforcement
due to the complexity of the regulations.
CURRENT TAX SCHEME – BUSINESS ENTITIES
As a general distinction, the I.R.C. recognizes three types of business
entities, each subject to a different tax scheme: corporations, partnerships,
and “disregarded” entities.21 These tax categories may or may not coincide
with the actual organizational status of the entity; a corporation may be
treated as a partnership for tax purposes, or vice versa, so it is convenient to
compartmentalize the different “purposes” of the same entity because they
may not necessarily overlap. Disregarded entities, as the name suggests in
a somewhat confusing manner, are not really entities. In simpler terms, the
existence of the entity for tax purposes is “disregarded” and the tax is
applied directly to the owner.22
This generally applies to sole
proprietorships where, also in terms of liability, formation, and financing,
the existence of the entity is disregarded such that the owner and the entity
are one and the same.23 Disregarded entities will not be further analyzed as
their tax treatment falls beyond the scope of this article. On the other hand,
partnerships and corporations have a greater significance in terms of
popularity, capitalization, and contradictory legislation.

20

AICPA, supra note 10.
26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (2016). There are other entities with special tax treatment, such as
non-profit corporations, trusts, foreign corporations, etc. The analysis of these “special entities” is
beyond the scope of this article.
22
Id.
23 Sole Proprietorship, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/sole-proprietorshi
p-0 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
21
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1. Partnerships
Partnerships are possibly the oldest form of business entity recognized
in history.24 As early as the 6th century, the laws of the Roman Empire
started recognizing certain business, trade, and religious associations known
as societas (literally “societies”), which had the ability to enter into
contracts and assume liability independently from their owners.25 Under the
common law, the legal concept of partnership, and the resulting joint and
several liability of the partners, was developed as early as the 18th
century.26 For tax purposes, partnerships are a type of “pass-through”
entity, that is, the entity itself does not pay income tax, but the owners do at
the individual level (so the tax “passes through” the entity to its owners).27
So, while there is a separation between the legal entity and its owners in
terms of contractual capacity and title to the assets, there is no such
separation in terms of assessing tax liability.28
2. Corporations
Corporations, like partnerships, have a millenary history.29 The oldest
known corporation was the Japanese temple construction company Kongo
Gumi, which was incorporated in the year 578 and terminated its
independent operations in 2006––an impressive record of 1,428 years in
business.30 This clearly highlights one of the main differences between a
corporation and a partnership; a corporation has an indefinite lifespan,
whereas the life of a partnership is tied to the life of its owners, unless
expressly provided otherwise in the partnership documents.31

24
MAX WEBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 120, (Lutz
Kaelber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003) (1889).
25
HAROLD JOSEPH BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 215–16, (Harvard Univ. Press 1983) (1918).
26
Waugh v. Carver, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P.).
27
Partnerships, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses&-Self-Employed/Partnerships (last updated Oct. 24, 2016). Even though a tax is not assessed against
the partnership itself, partnerships still have to report their income to the IRS using Form 1065. The
owners must then include their portion of the partnership income in their own personal tax returns.
28
Id.
29
James Olan Hutcheson, The End of a 1,400-Year-Old Business, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16,
2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-04-16/the-end-of-a-1-400-year-oldbusinessbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
30
Id.
31
As a default provision, a partnership terminates 90 days after one of the partners dies or
decides to leave the partnership. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2)(i) (1997). However, partnership
agreements generally contain specific provisions to avoid involuntary dissolution. The partnership
agreement governs over the default statutory rules. “In the absence of prohibitory provisions of the
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Another record holding corporation is the Dutch East India Company
(chartered in 1602), recognized as the first multinational corporation, and
the first corporate entity to ever issue stock to the public.32 This highlights
another major feature of corporations––the ability to issue stock to the
public to raise capital, which is not a feature of partnerships. The third
major difference between corporations and partnerships, and the last one
relevant for this article,33 is the tax regime applied to each entity. As
previously discussed, partnerships are “pass-through” entities for tax
purposes; corporations are not. In terms of liability, contracting capacity,
and tax purposes, a corporation “occupies the same position as a natural
person sui juris.”34 This means that the income of a corporation is taxed
first at the corporate level––the corporation files Form 1120 and pays its
corporate income tax35––and then at the individual level, when the
shareholders receive a dividend.36 Generally speaking, the three types of
dividends are the ordinary dividend, qualified dividend, and capital gain
distribution.37 The three dividends are taxed at different rates: an ordinary
dividend is taxed at the receiving individual’s personal tax rate; a qualified
dividend is taxed at either 0%, 15%, or 20%; and a capital gain distribution
is taxed similarly to a qualified dividend.38 At the source, corporate income
is taxed in brackets ranging from 15% to 35%.39
3. A Hybrid Statutory Creation: LLCs
Historically, the difference between partnerships and corporations
makes sense. A corporation provides a shield to liability for its owners
who, in exchange for this liability protection, are subject to a double tax

statutes or of rules of the common law relating to partnerships, or considerations of public policy, the
partners . . . may include in the partnership articles any agreement they wish.” Lanier v. Bowdoin, 24
N.E. 2d 732, 735 (1939).
32
Clem Chambers, Who Needs Stock Exchanges?, MONDO VISIONE (July 14, 2006), http://www.
mondovisione.com/exchanges/handbook-articles/who-needs-stock-exchanges/.
33
The first full list of criteria that identifies an entity as a corporation is discussed in Morrissey
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). Four criteria have been recognized as making a corporation
different from other business forms, and will be hereinafter referred to as “corporate characteristics.”
34
See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2 (addressing the extent of capacity of a
corporation) (citing Johnson v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., Ltd., 41 Mont. 158, 165 (1910).
35
Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses&-Self-Employed/Corporations (last updated July 8, 2016).
36
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Cat. No. 15093R, PUBLICATION 550: INVESTMENT INCOME AND
EXPENSES 20 (2014).
37
Id.
38
Capital gains distributions have a separate tax schedule. See id. at 70. However, for purposes
of this article, the tax schedule of capital gains distributions and qualified dividends overlap.
39
I.R.C. § 11 (West 2016).
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regime. In a very pragmatic way, the government charges a price for a
service. The “sovereign” collects a double tax in exchange for the grant of
an indefinite life span, limited liability, and the possibility of raising capital
on the public markets.40 Then, everything changed when Wyoming first
started to recognize the Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) as a business
form.41 During the 1970s, other states followed Wyoming’s steps by
enacting limited liability statutes. In 1988, Revenue Ruling 88-76
determined that certain entities that met some, but not all, of the “corporate
characteristics”42 would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes.43 LLCs
were recognized as “pass-through” entities for tax purposes, but they also
had limited liability by statute.44 With the objective of stopping the surge of
tax cases crowding the federal courts after the enactment of the LLC state
statutes, the IRS adopted the so-called “check-the-box” tax regulations in
1997, affording taxpayers the ability to elect their preferred tax status.45
LLCs enjoy the broadest choice because, by literally checking a box in
Form 8832, an LLC could elect to be treated (for tax purposes) as either a
pass-through entity (which is the default provision in case no election is
made),46 or as a corporation taxed under either Subchapter C, or Subchapter
S of the corporate tax code.47
LLCs are interesting statutory creatures because they represent a
change from the old dichotomist universe of partnerships vis-à-vis
corporations. LLCs are, essentially, corporations, except they cannot raise
capital by issuing shares on the public market and they do not have to pay
corporate taxes.48 This highlights the first controversy of the current
corporate tax system. Does it make sense to have a corporate tax at all? The
assessment of a corporate tax may have been a tradeoff for a corporation to
obtain several benefits over a partnership. Today, most of these benefits are
available without any tradeoff by forming an LLC. In terms of a costbenefit analysis, corporate taxes appear to be the price corporations have to
pay to sell shares on the public market––the only effective difference
between today’s corporations and LLCs. This idea is corroborated by the
existence of another “hybrid” business form, the “S-Corporation.”49 The S40

Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 et seq., repealed by 2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws 94.
42
See Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344; see also Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
43
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
44
Id.
45
I.R.C. § 7701 (West 2016).
46
Id.
47
I.R.C. § 1361 (West 2016).
48
Rev. Rule 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 350.
49 S-Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-businesses
-&-Self-Employed/S-Corporations (last updated Aug. 1, 2016). Other restrictions apply, but they are
41
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Corporation is a special statutory variant of a “traditional” corporation.
Once formed, a corporation can, somewhat similarly to an LLC, “check the
box” and elect to be taxed under Chapter I, Subchapter S of the I.R.C.,
instead of the default taxation under Subchapter C.50 S-Corporations are
another type of pass-through entity, which, similarly to LLCs, have
restrictions on share ownership.51 For example, S-Corporations cannot
have more than one hundred shareholders,52 making it impossible to trade
S-Corporations’ shares on a public stock exchange.
For the small business owner, this is all nonsense. John Doe, our
sample small business owner, does not care whether his company is called
“J.D. Inc.,” “J.D. LLC,” or “J.D. and partners.” All John Doe cares about
is, laconically, limited liability and having to pay the lowest amount of
taxes possible. A mom-and-pop shop owner has no short-term aspiration of
getting a ticker symbol and starting to trade its shares on a stock exchange.
So, the benefit of trading shares on a public market is reserved to larger
corporations, those which meet the capital requirements to be listed on a
stock exchange, but the double taxation of corporations affects all corporate
entities, big or small, publicly traded or not. This creates, in a way, a
windfall to larger corporate entities because they are essentially the ones
reaping the only remaining benefit of the corporate form. But, do large
corporations actually pay for this benefit? The answer is “sometimes,” and
this takes us to the next section of this article, tax avoidance.
TAX AVOIDANCE
This section will focus on the most well-known schemes employed by
large multinational corporations to reduce their overall tax burden. Not to
be confused with underreporting or tax evasion, these practices are
completely legal (except when they result in tax evasion) and they are
herein exposed to highlight some additional contradictions created by the
existing provisions of the I.R.C. This section will address, in order, the
practices of transfer pricing (with profit shifting to tax-havens) and stock
option deductions.

not relevant for the purposes of this article as they relate to the nationality of the shareholders, allowable
business purpose, etc.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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TRANSFER PRICING – GOODS
Transfer pricing, simply put, is the practice of altering the price of a
good sold in a transaction between controlled subsidiaries to keep profits
where the corporate income taxes are lowest.53 Transfer pricing is best
described with an example. CC Corp. (“CC”) is a United States-based
manufacturer of cola drinks sold everywhere in the world. CC buys its
aluminum cans from one of its subsidiaries, A Inc., (“A”), which is
incorporated in the Bahamas where there is no corporate tax. The market
price for an aluminum can is $1, and CC sells its cola cans on the market
for $2. Instead of purchasing the cans at the market price of $1, CC directs
A to sell its cans above the market price, at $2 each. CC keeps purchasing
the overpriced cans, and it keeps selling its cola products at $2 each, thus
making no profits at all. On the other hand, A is capturing all the profits
that would have been made by CC, which would have been subject to the
35% corporate tax rate in the United States. With this simple “trick,” CC is
now making no profits at all from its United States activities. All the profits
are being kept in A, in the Bahamas, where they are not subject to any
corporate tax.
What is the economic impact of this type of tax avoidance? The
problem can be analyzed from three different perspectives. First, CC is
effectively avoiding corporate tax altogether, saving $0.35 for each can of
cola sold during the tax year. At the other end of the spectrum, the IRS is
losing precious revenue, that is, those very same $0.35 per can. Lastly,
there is the perspective of subsidiary A. Do these famous $0.35 per can at
least go towards developing the economy of the Bahamas, expanding the
local aluminum production industry, and creating jobs on the island? No.
In most cases, corporations like our subsidiary A are just empty “shells”
consisting of only a name and a P.O. Box without any real activity. A does
not produce anything, it just takes title to some aluminum cans bought on
the market and sold to its parent company at an artificially inflated price.
For obvious reasons, the I.R.C. prohibits the activities described in the
example above.54 Transactions involving controlled entities must be
reported to the IRS and are subject to strict supervision and reporting
requirements.55 I.R.C. provisions require that the transactions between

53
Transfer Price – Definition, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition
/transfer-price.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
54
26 C.F.R. § 1.482 (2016).
55
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Form 5471: Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect
to Certain Foreign Corporations (2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Form 5472: Information Return of
a 25% Foreign-Owned U.S. Corporation or a Foreign Corporation Engaged in a U.S. Trade or Business
(2016).
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controlled entities be at arm’s-length, that is, the controlled entity must
behave as if it was uncontrolled.56 Applying the rule to the example above,
subsidiary A would have been forced to sell the aluminum cans at the going
market price of $1 each, instead of the marked-up price of $2 each.
However, real-world transactions are never so clear-cut, and this creates
room for argument. The I.R.C. recognizes that different transactions in
different contexts may have different results, and therefore it introduces the
so-called “standard of comparability.”57 The standard of comparability, and
related provisions, can be summarized as follows: because no two
transactions are identical, the reporting corporation should do its best to
reproduce, in a transaction involving a controlled subsidiary, the context of
a transaction involving an uncontrolled third party corporation.58
There are various methods used to determine how an arm’s-length
transaction between the two controlled entities would be structured.59 The
I.R.C. requires that the “best method”––the one that better simulates an
arm’s-length transaction––is employed for proper reporting.60 So, back to
our example, executives from CC and subsidiary A will sit at the
negotiation table and will start looking at various factors when determining
the price A should charge to CC. These factors include, for example, the
price A charges to other companies for the same product, the economic
conditions of the country where A is located, the volume of the trade
between the two corporations, quality of the products, currency risk, etc.61
After a thorough examination of all the relevant factors, the executives
prepare an extensive report describing how A is selling special aluminum
cans to CC, which are 100% recyclable and made only with high-quality
aluminum coming from “responsible” mines where there is no exploitation
of the workers. To sweeten the deal, A will offer an extended 4-year
warranty on the cans and, given the long-standing commercial relationship
between the two firms, A will extend a credit line to CC at a mere 5%
interest rate. CC will purchase the aluminum cans from A, who will take
care of the shipping, at an all-inclusive price of $1.80 per can; a true bargain
given all the perks CC is getting with the deal. With these added facts, CC
buys the cans for $1.89 (the purchase price plus the interest on the credit
line) from A, and sells the cola products for the same $2.00 each. CC then

56

26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(b) (2016).
26 C.F.R. § 1.482(d)(1)–(2) (2016).
58
Id.
59
A full list of acceptable accounting methods can be found in DELOITTE, 2015 GLOBAL
TRANSFER PRICING COUNTRY GUIDE (2015). However, a discussion of the difference between the
various methods is beyond the scope of this article.
60
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(c) (2016).
61
See id.
57
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reports the transaction to the IRS, files its taxes, and pays the 35% tax rate
on its $0.11 of domestic profit. CC then writes a check to the IRS for
approximately $0.03 per can. CC has respected all the current laws, and its
management has effectively reduced the income tax expense of the
corporation by 89%, from the initial $0.35 per can, to the current $0.03 per
can.
TRANSFER PRICING – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The concept of transfer pricing does not apply only to goods. As a
matter of fact, goods are fairly easy to price because they are tangible, can
be classified, subjected to international standards for quality, etc. Pricing
becomes a lot more complex when the object of the trade is intellectual
property (“I.P.”). In many cases, corporations develop new products, which
are then licensed for use to subsidiaries. The accurate selection of corporate
structure and licensing agreements between various tiers of subsidiaries can
relieve multinational corporations of large amounts of tax liability.
A typical example of an I.P. transfer pricing is the famous profitshifting scheme known as “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich,” pioneered
by Apple, Inc., and soon followed by other technology and pharmaceutical
corporations.62 This strategy is centered on the possibility of an Irelandincorporated entity to be taxed under a different country’s tax regime.63
Irish law, in fact, determines the residency of a corporate entity based on
where the corporation’s management is located.64
Here is how it all works. A U.S. corporation enters into a cost-sharing
agreement with a wholly owned subsidiary in a tax-haven, such as
Bermuda. This tax-haven subsidiary is incorporated in Ireland, but is
subject to Bermuda corporate tax because the main office and management
of the corporation are in Bermuda.65 This corporation is the “First Irish.”
The cost-sharing agreement provides that the U.S. corporation and the First
Irish will split, 50-50, the development cost of a new technology and patent.
The First Irish will retain the patent and license it for use to the U.S.
corporation, this way the U.S. corporation can recognize an initial tax
saving by reducing its taxable income by its 50% contribution to the new

62
Martin A. Sullivan, Apple Reports High Rate but Saves Billions on Taxes, TAX ANALYSTS,
Feb. 13, 2012, at 777, http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/134tn0777.pdf.
63
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, Tax Facts 2015: The Essential Guide to Irish Tax (2015),
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2015-pwc-ireland-tax-facts.pdf.
64
[2.2.3] Company Residence in the State 4–5, IRISH TAX & CUSTOMS, http://www.revenue.ie/
en/about/foi/s16/income-tax-capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-02/02-02-03.pdf (last updated July
2015).
65
Id.
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technology, and by the amount of the royalties paid to the First Irish for the
I.P. license. This initial licensing agreement is regulated by the transfer
pricing requirements of an arm’s-length transaction imposed by U.S. law.66
Then, the First Irish sub-licenses the same I.P. received from the U.S.
corporation to a wholly owned Dutch subsidiary. Lastly, the Dutch
subsidiary sub-sub-licenses the very same I.P. to a second Irish corporation,
this time doing business in the EU (the “Second Irish”). The Second Irish
books all the sales of products and services outside of the United States.
Then, the Second Irish pays a large royalty to the Dutch corporation for the
I.P. it licensed, maintaining the profits in the Second Irish at a minimum,
and, in any case, subject to the lower Irish tax rate of 12.5%.67 This first
royalty is not subject to withholding tax,68 so the money flows untaxed from
Ireland to the Netherlands. The Dutch corporation then pays a large royalty
to the First Irish in Bermuda, maintaining the profits of the Dutch
corporation to a minimum and, in any case, subject to the lower Dutch tax
rate of 25%.69 This second transfer is not subject to withholding tax either
because of the many bilateral tax treaties signed by the Netherlands, of
which Bermuda is a party.70 The corporation in Bermuda books the vast
majority the profits and pays no corporate tax. How does the money get
back to the United States? The corporation in Bermuda could transfer
money back to the United States at any time by paying a dividend to its
parent company, obviously subject to taxes for the repatriation of income.71
Since this arrangement relies heavily on the use of I.P. and licensing
agreements, it is mostly used by technology and pharmaceutical
corporations, and the more unique and profitable the I.P. is, the larger the
tax savings.72 It is estimated that the “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich”
arrangement saved Apple between $2.4 and $4.8 billion on its tax bills in
2011 alone.73

66

See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2.
Corporation Tax, IRISH TAX AND CUSTOMS, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/ct/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
68
See Council Directive 03/49, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 157/49) (EC), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0049:en:HTML.
69
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS (2014).
70
For a complete list of the tax treaties of the Netherlands, see Overview of Treaty Countries,
DUTCH TAX ADMINISTRATION, http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belasting
dienst/individuals/tax_arrangements/tax_treaties/overview_of_treaty_countries/.
71
See I.R.C. § 884(a) (West 2016). Branch profits tax, subjecting dividends from U.S.
controlled foreign corporations to a 30% withholding tax.
72
See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 777–78.
73
Id. Note that the Irish legislature has changed the provisions allowing this transfer pricing
scheme with the enactment of the Finance Act 2014 (Act No. 26/2014) (Ir.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/26/pdfs/ukpga_20140026_en.pdf, which more strictly
enforces taxation of Irish corporations and more narrowly defines the corporate residency requirements.
67
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TRANSFER PRICING – CAPITAL, A/K/A “LIQUIDITY TRANSFER
PRICING”
Another interesting way to shape transfer pricing is the so-called
“liquidity transfer pricing.”74 This technique is relied upon mostly by banks
or financial institutions with large amounts of cash.75 Liquidity transfer
pricing is not necessarily a tool for tax avoidance, but rather a system of
adequate performance reporting.76 The importance of liquidity transfer
pricing as a risk management tool was stressed by the Basel Committee on
Bank Supervision with the introduction of the Basel III capital requirements
in December 2010.77 While the regulatory and risk management aspects of
liquidity transfer pricing are beyond the scope of this article,78 liquidity
transfer pricing may also be another useful tool to lower the overall tax
liability of large multinational corporations.
The way liquidity transfer pricing works is similar to the other forms
of transfer pricing, except that the “price” in this case is the interest charged
on a loan. Let us go back to the “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich”
example above. Our U.S. multinational corporation has effectively avoided
the U.S. corporate income tax, but is now facing a difficult decision. The
corporation could repatriate the cash accumulated in Bermuda, and pay a
hefty profit repatriation tax,79 which in some cases can be as high as 30% of
the amount repatriated in the form of dividends.80 Alternatively, the
corporation could keep the money in Bermuda, tax-free until repatriated,
and enjoy the benefits of tax-deferral.81 Often, corporations prefer to
accumulate cash in tax-havens, enjoying the benefits of tax-deferral
However, all those entities incorporated before January 1, 2015, will have a “grace period” until 2020
before they will be affected by the new provisions of the Finance Act 2014. Based on the estimates in
Dr. Sullivan’s article for the past fiscal performance of Apple, the U.S. multinational alone should be
able to save another $10–20 billion before the new measures enter into force in 2020.
74
Steve Culp, Liquidity Transfer Pricing is Now a Key Element in Banks’ Success, FORBES
(Sept. 12, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2013/09/12/liquidity-transfer-pricingis-now-a-key-element-in-banks-success/.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See id; see also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, LIQUIDITY TRANSFER PRICING: A
GUIDE TO BETTER PRACTICE (2011), http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers10.htm.
78
For a proper account of the regulatory impact of Basel III regulations on liquidity and capital
requirements, see generally José Gabilondo, Bank Funding: A Post-Crisis View (Oct. 22, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
79
See I.R.C. § 884(a) (West 2016).
80
Id.
81
David Alexander, Big U.S. Firms Hold $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid Taxes: Study,
REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/06/us-usa-tax-offshoreidUSKCN0S008U20151006#FqYgQUDfAc1X9Yzg.97 (describing how most Fortune 500 companies
operate subsidiaries in tax-havens, and hold an approximate total of $2.1 trillion therein).
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similarly to individuals with 401(k) plans.82 However, profits may need to
be repatriated for a variety of reasons, ranging from capital needs, to
downturns in the economy.
In order to deal with these temporary cash shortages, the foreign
subsidiary may use liquidity transfer pricing to avoid the profit repatriation
tax. Instead of paying a dividend to its U.S. parent company, the subsidiary
can offer it a loan. Obviously, the loan will have to be structured as an
arm’s-length transaction, in line with the going market rate, etc.83 This
practice offers a threefold advantage. First, it avoids the profit repatriation
tax. Second, it gives the multinational yet another opportunity to shift
profits towards the foreign subsidiary as the U.S. parent company makes
payments of interest and principal on its loans. Third, the interest paid by
the parent company to the subsidiary is tax-deductible for U.S. tax
purposes.84
STOCK OPTION DEDUCTIONS
The last tool for corporate tax avoidance discussed in this article is the
deduction of stock options from taxable income. Similar to accelerated
depreciation, the stock option deduction is a tax “fiction,” that is, a
deductible non-cash expense, which can be used to reduce the taxable
corporate income.85 Executives and directors in larger corporations receive
the majority of their remuneration through stock options,86 rather than in
cash as a salary. The stock option grants the holder a right to purchase a
definite amount of the corporation’s stock, at a definite price (the issue
price), independent of market fluctuations.87 Common practice for the
recipient of the stock option is to exercise the purchase right only when the
market value of the stock is higher than the issue price of the option, in
order to immediately profit from the difference in prices. This type of
compensation is highly desirable for the executive and the corporation
because of the substantial tax benefits it offers, as will be discussed in more

82

Id.
See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2.
84
I.R.C. § 163 (West 2016).
85
I.R.C. § 162 (West 2016).
86
There are two types of stock options: qualified and nonqualified. The options referred to in
this article–those issued as compensation to highly remunerated executives–are the nonqualified type,
subject to the provisions of I.R.C. Section 83. See generally JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL31458, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: TAX TREATMENT AND TAX ISSUES (2012) (discussing the
current statutory scheme governing stock options, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
qualified and nonqualified stock options), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent/cgi?arti
cle=1935&context=key_workplace.
87
Id.
83
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detail below.
The transaction can be analyzed from both the perspective of the
corporation and the perspective of the executive. The executive receives
the regular salary in cash, and a bonus stock option. The issue price of the
option does not have to be anywhere near the market price of the stock, it
can be set arbitrarily, as long as the option cannot be actively traded.88
While the executive pays income tax on the cash salary as it is earned, the
stock option is not taxable until it is exercised, because its value cannot be
“readily ascertained” until it is traded.89 The executive enjoys tax-deferral
on the stock option until the day it is exercised.90
From the corporation’s perspective, the deal is even sweeter. First, the
corporation provides an alternative form of compensation to its highest paid
executives, therefore reducing what would otherwise be a direct cash
outflow. Second, the corporation can deduct the full exercise price of the
option.91 While the deduction is used only in the year when the executive
decides to exercise (so it may not produce an immediate tax benefit for the
corporation), the amount of the deduction is substantial because these
options represent the bulk of the employee compensation expenses for most
corporations. Third, when the option is exercised and the corporation books
the deduction, there is still no cash outflow on the part of the corporation.
The “expense” deducted is only an opportunity cost to the corporation, that
is, what the corporation would have registered as a cash inflow if it had sold
its stock to the market, instead of giving it as an option to the executive.92
After understanding the mechanisms of the existing I.R.C. provisions with
respect to transfer pricing and stock option deductions, the next section will
focus on possible solutions to address the problem of excessive tax
avoidance.
A PROPOSAL
Since the Tax Reform Act, signed in 1986 by former-president
Reagan, multiple studies and proposals have been analyzed to determine a
88
26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(2) (2016); Cramer v. Commissioner, 64 F. 3d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that a stock option that cannot be freely alienable does not have a “readily ascertainable
fair market value.”). Note that, as described in the sources, it is the option itself which cannot be freely
traded rather than the stock of the corporation. Therefore, a publicly traded company can issue a nontransferrable traded stock option to one specific executive, and still be able to set the issue price of the
option at will.
89
I.R.C. § 83(e)(3) (West 2016) (exempting property of unascertainable value from the inclusion
into the taxpayer’s gross income).
90
Id.
91
I.R.C. § 162 (West 2016).
92
The effects of share dilution are assumed to be minimal.
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relatively simple, administrable, fair, and effective tax system.93 Yet, no
major tax reform has taken place in the last thirty years.94 Out of the
different studies already performed by private and public entities, perhaps
the most detailed and inclusive is the 1992 Report on Tax Integration
redacted by the Department of the Treasury.95 The most important
distinction between the Report on Tax Integration and other studies is that it
analyzes tax reform not only from the perspective of the taxpayer, but also
from the standpoint of the Government.96
This different perspective adds a layer of complexity to the analysis of
a proposed tax reform because, in addition to the ideals of equity and
fairness in the tax system exposed in the earlier sections of this article, an
effective tax reform must be easy to implement and grant an equal or
increased revenue stream for the Government (tax-neutrality).97 While this
article will focus only on the problems of transfer pricing and stock option
deductions, rather than on the corporate tax system at large, the same
principles of efficient and effective tax reform expressed in the Department
of the Treasury’s Report on Tax Integration will be taken into
consideration. The next sections will analyze the problem of tax avoidance
and propose a solution based on a model of international competitiveness.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO TRANSFER PRICING TAX AVOIDANCE
Transfer pricing is a complex problem to resolve because it does not
derive from the tax code (and relative loopholes) of a single country, but
rather it is the result of the existing gaps and discrepancies between the tax
systems of different countries. Although “[n]o consensus exists about the
proper norms for capital taxation in economies with international capital
and labor mobility,”98 the OECD has developed a set of actions to be taken
by member countries in order to address the problem of transfer pricing on
a global scale.99 The suggested solution of the OECD Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project, however, does not deviate substantially

93
Andrew Lundeen, A Lot Has Changed in the 27 Years Since the Last Major Tax Reform, TAX
FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/lot-has-changed-27-years-last-major-tax-reform;
see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12.
94
Lundeen, supra note 93.
95
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 75.
99
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING PROJECT: ACTION 13: GUIDANCE
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
REPORTING (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/beps-2015-final-reports.htm.
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from what appears to be the present practice of corporate America.100 The
OECD BEPS best practices would require large multinational corporations
to maintain a three-tiered system of documentation in order to ensure that
the principle of arm’s-length dealing is respected among the controlled
subsidiaries of the Multi National Enterprise (“MNE”).101 However, just
like it happens today under the IRS directives,102 it is possible to structure a
transaction in a way that satisfies the requirements of the arm’s-length
principle while still shifting a portion of the profits of the MNE to a low-tax
jurisdiction.103 Although the more in-depth reporting required under the
OECD BEPS guidelines will make transfer pricing more difficult, it will not
solve the problem; a group of skilled accountants and lawyers can still
manipulate the form of a transaction so as to maintain the substance of
profit shifting. Because added reporting requirements simply will not do,
perhaps the most effective remedy to transfer pricing practices is the
creation of an incentive not to engage in the practice; namely, reducing the
statutory corporate tax rate. This may seem to have been a long read for
such an “easy fix,” but there is more to the matter than it seems.
Transfer pricing is a technique to transfer profits from a high-tax
jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction.104 A MNE acting as a rational
decision-maker tries to maximize its utility, and engages in transfer pricing.
Clearly, in a fictitious scenario where every country in the world had the
exact same tax rate, transfer pricing would not provide any meaningful
financial advantage because our rational decision-making entity would be
indifferent between the available alternatives. The reality is more complex,
however, because the statutory tax rate by itself does not reflect the full
extent of the “utility” derived from the choice of a tax jurisdiction over
another.
Countries have widely different tax systems, reporting
requirements and standards, penalties for underreporting, enforcement
systems, etc. All of these factors, together with the statutory tax rate, are
taken into account by the rational decision-making MNE when determining
the utility derived from the allocation of profits in one specific jurisdiction
rather than another. The bureaucracy associated with tax reporting and

100

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 35, at 20.
OECD guidelines essentially increase the reporting requirements to ensure that every
transaction between controlled subsidiaries is at arm’s-length. The proposed three-tier increased
reporting requirement includes: “(i) a master file containing standardised information relevant for all
MNE group members; (ii) a local file referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer;
and (iii) a Country-by-Country Report containing certain information relating to the global allocation of
the MNE group’s income and taxes paid together with certain indicators of the location of economic
activity within the MNE group.” OECD, supra note 99.
102
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 35, at 20.
103
See Transfer Pricing – Goods section above.
104
Transfer Price – Definition, supra note 53.
101
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compliance has a cost, and this cost is taken into account in determining the
overall utility of shifting profits to a specific country.
Further, the MNE needs to take into account the cost of tax-avoidance
and potential non-compliance. Stated differently, before shifting any profits
around the world, the MNE will make sure that for every dollar spent on
tax-avoidance (the bills of some professionals in the income defense
industry can be very expensive), there is at least an equal or greater saving
on the corporate tax bill, plus an allowance for any penalties in case the taxavoidance crosses the line of underreporting.105
The decision of choosing which jurisdiction has the best tax regime is
not an easy one as it requires the balancing of many disparate factors. The
mechanics of a similar decision-making process are interestingly modeled
in a quantitative study conducted at the Leibniz Information Centre for
Economics,106 which will help us understand the importance of the statutory
tax rate in the context of the other factors. The study aims at creating a
dimensionless number–the Tax Attractiveness Index–which quantifies the
desirability of a specific tax jurisdiction.107 For our purposes, the Tax
Attractiveness Index can be equated to the utility received by the MNE
when choosing a certain tax jurisdiction. In the study, the U.S. tax system
ranks among the countries with the lowest Tax Attractiveness Index.108
One of the factors that most heavily influences such a low score is the
negative effect of a very high statutory tax rate.109 What this study reveals,
in simpler words, is that if a MNE was evaluating where to shift its profits,
the United States would be at the bottom of the list.110 Further, the study
finds that one of the main reasons for such a low score is the very high
statutory tax rate in the United States.111 Therefore, a reduction of the
statutory corporate tax rate alone may greatly increase the Tax
Attractiveness Index of the United States, without the need for a complete
restructuring of the corporate tax system.
While a reduction of the corporate statutory tax rate alone will not
completely resolve the problems of equity and fairness of the tax system at

105
See Myles Udland, The IRS Says Coke Owes 3.3 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 18, 2015, 1:45
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/irs-coca-cola-tax-bill-2015-9 (describing how Coca-Cola is under
investigation by the IRS for shifting profits abroad through transfer pricing.) It is striking that CocaCola seemed to be following reporting guidelines suggested by the IRS itself.
106
SARA KELLER & DEBORAH SCHANZ, Measuring Tax Attractiveness Across Countries, THE
OPEN ACCESS PUBLICATION SERVER OF THE ZBW – LEIBNIZ INFORMATION CENTR. FOR ECONOMICS
(June 9, 2013) (manuscript), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75220.
107
Id. at 43, Table 1.
108
Id. at 45, Table 3.
109
Id. at 29.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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large, a relatively small statutory modification may have a substantial
impact in terms of reducing the existing inefficiencies of the current tax
scheme. First of all, a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will
reduce the inequality between corporate and unincorporated entities.
Currently, real estate investment trusts and certain limited liability entities
in the oil drilling and exploration industry enjoy a tax advantage over
publicly traded corporations as they are not subject to double taxation.112 A
reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will consequently reduce the
bias towards non-corporate entities, therefore increasing inter-group equity
and fairness, which was one of the problems described in Section I, Part A
of this article.113 Similarly, a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate
will reduce the bias towards earning retention vis-à-vis dividend
distribution precisely because of a reduced burden in the double taxation of
corporate profits. A lesser impact of the tax consequences in corporate
decision-making processes will hopefully lead to less biased, and more
efficient, decisions with a consequent improvement in corporate
performance.
A reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will most likely translate
into an immediate reduction of tax revenue for the government, creating a
problem of tax-neutrality.114 However, the decrease in tax revenue, if any,
will be only marginal. The Tax Policy Center reports that in 2014 corporate
tax receipts accounted for only 10.6% of the total receipts, compared to the
46.2% of the personal income tax.115 Therefore, a reduction in the
corporate tax rate will affect the total tax receipts much less than a proposed
change to the personal income tax rate. Further, although the literature on
the matter is not conclusive, a 2011 study published in the INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE suggests that a weak, negative
causality exists between corporate tax rate and per capita GDP growth.116
The study does not provide us with a correlation indicator, which would be
useful in determining how the changes in one variable (corporate tax rate)
affect the other (per capita GDP growth).117 However, the study
qualitatively concludes that a reduction in corporate tax rates will
moderately stimulate GDP growth.118 For our purposes, this could
112

See AICPA, supra note 10.
Id.
114
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at 5.
115
Historical Tables: Table 2.1 Receipts by Source: 1934–2020, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/hist02z1.xls (last visited Nov.
2, 2016).
116
Stella Karagianni et al., Tax Burden Distribution and GDP Growth: Non-linear Causality
Considerations in the USA, 21 INT’L REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 186, 192 (2012).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 193.
113
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potentially translate into an offset of the tax receipts reduction mentioned
earlier in this paragraph. However, more precise quantitative studies need
to be conducted on the matter before the problem of tax-neutrality can be
considered resolved.
One last aspect of tax neutrality needs to be considered under this
model. The increase in the overall competitiveness of the U.S. business
environment will likely stimulate investment in the country. As discussed
in earlier sections, the Tax Attractiveness of the United States is among the
lowest in the study mainly because of the high statutory corporate tax
rate.119 Nonetheless, the United States houses a vast majority of the largest
and most profitable corporations in the world.120 This is because,
notwithstanding its high corporate tax rates, the United States offers a
fertile land for businesses, with relatively limited regulations on
entrepreneurs and start-up businesses; an efficient justice system, which
enforces the protection of property and the collection of debts; multiple
large stock exchanges and securities markets; and a relatively efficient and
transparent administration of the government.121 While all of these benefits
to businesses attract investments, high taxation discourages them, reducing
the competitiveness of the system as a whole on the international
investment market.122 In terms of transfer pricing, as mentioned earlier, this
creates an incentive to shift profits abroad. However, as the tax differential
with other countries is reduced, this “incentive” to shift money abroad is
also reduced, up to a point of equilibrium, where the push to move money
out of the country is nonexistent. By setting a corporate tax rate just below
this “equilibrium” point, there would be a small incentive for MNEs to
move or maintain profits inside of the United States rather than outside.
Unfortunately, again, an exact quantitative measure of what this new, lower
tax rate should be is extremely difficult to estimate with precision.123
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO STOCK OPTION DEDUCTIONS TAX
AVOIDANCE
The problem of non-statutory stock options lies in the wording of one
provision of the I.R.C. and its related Section in the C.F.R., I.R.C. Section
83(h) and C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a)–(b). These sections provide for the
119

See KELLER & SCHANZ, supra note 106.
See generally Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2016) (providing general background information on the largest 500 corporations in the world).
121
See Ease of Doing Business in the United States, WORLD BANK DOING BUSINESS PROJECT,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-states (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
122
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at 4.
123
Karagianni et al., supra note 116.
120
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taxation of nonqualified (or non-statutory) stock options, and for the
standard used to determine whether the option has a readily ascertainable
market value.124 As explained earlier in the paragraph, these types of
options allow both the receiving executive and the issuing corporation to
realize substantial savings in tax liability. The taxable income is recognized
by the individual when the option is exercised,125 while at the same time the
corporation books a deductible non-cash expense.126
In order to provide a solution to the tax avoidance problem presented
by stock option deductions, it is necessary to identify how stock options
should be taxed and how to assess the tax liability. To determine how to
tax stock options, we perform an analysis of the transaction under the
“business purpose” and “substance over form” doctrines. To determine
how to assess the tax liability, we will propose an amendment to the
statutory language in the relevant Sections of the I.R.C.
1. How to Tax Stock Options
A non-statutory stock option is a form of compensation, just like a
salary.127 The I.R.C. considers certain stock option plans (qualified stock
options) as compensation, and those stock options are subject to
withholding taxes like FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) and
FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax Act), which are calculated based on the
cash value of the stock compensation under the plan.128 Nonqualified stock
options should be no different, and should therefore be taxed as regular cash
salary. The U.S. tax administration and courts recognize the legal doctrines
of “substance over form” and “business purpose.”129 Both doctrines derive
from the Supreme Court ruling in Gregory v. Helvering, a case decided in
1935.130 These same doctrines should be applied when analyzing the issue
of stock option deductions.
Seven years before the case was decided by the Supreme Court,
petitioner Evelyn Gregory was the sole stockholder of United Mortgage
Corporation (“United”), which, in turn, owned stock of another corporation,
124

26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(a)–(b) (2016).
I.R.C. § 83(b) (West 2016).
126
I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 2016).
127
See Janet Novack, Stock Options Meant Big Tax Savings for Apple and JPMorgan, as Well as
Facebook., FORBES (Apr. 24, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaetnovack/2013/04/24/stoc
k-options-meant-big-tax-savings-for-apple-and-jp-morgan-as-well-as-facebook/#82f9fd225036.
128
I.R.C. § 3121(a)(22)(A) (West 2016) (FICA applied to certain stock compensation plans);
I.R.C. § 3301 (West 2016) (assessing FUTA tax on all “wages,” as defined in I.R.C. § 3306(b)(19)(A)
(West 2016), to include the cash value of certain stock compensation plans).
129
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468 (1935).
130
Id.
125
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Monitor Securities Corporation (“Monitor”).131 Gregory intended to
transfer the Monitor shares owned by United to herself, without having to
pay taxes on the distribution.132 Gregory devised the following strategy to
dodge her tax bill. First, she incorporated a new company in Delaware,
called Averill Corporation (“Averill”), of which she was the sole
shareholder. Three days later, she transferred all of the Monitor shares to
Averill in a transaction that complied with the tax exemption requirements
of a reorganization under Section 112(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928.
Lastly, she dissolved Averill and distributed the Monitor shares, the only
asset owned by Averill, to herself.133
Helvering, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, sued Gregory on
the basis that the transaction had no purpose other than tax avoidance.134
However, the Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner’s view
because the transaction fell squarely within the boundaries of the law at the
time.135 The Commissioner appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, which reversed the lower court, and certified the question to the
Supreme Court.136 The Supreme Court decision is a milestone in tax law;
however, it is somewhat controversial.
The opinion stated, in one of the opening paragraphs, that “[t]he legal
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted.”137 The Court cited relevant authority, and the opinion should
have stopped there, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals and upholding
the right of a taxpayer to minimize its tax burden. After all, what Gregory
did was perfectly legal, as held by the Court itself.
However, the opinion did not stop there and went beyond the plain
language of the law, although unambiguous, creating two doctrines of
judicial invention: the business purpose doctrine, which states that if a
transaction has no other business purpose but to reduce the amount of taxes
payable, the transaction will be disregarded; and the substance over form
doctrine, which states that the underlying substance of a transaction, and not
its form, should be taken into account when determining tax liability.138
The case set forth language, which suggested a bright line test to

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469–70.
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determine whether the business purpose doctrine applies.139 The Court
stated, in relevant part, that a transaction should be disregarded if it has “no
business or corporate purpose;” but the transaction is in fact “a mere
device.”140 This implies that a transaction with any corporate or business
purpose should not be disregarded. However, a corporation never has the
sole purpose of tax avoidance. Most corporations are created with the
purpose, as stated in their bylaws, of conducting “any and all lawful
business.” Even Averill, the “device” corporation created by Gregory,
performed lawful business until it was closed, as recognized by the Court.141
Therefore, the test set out by the Court is less of a bright-line rule than the
language in the opinion seemed to suggest. Rather, the test conforms more
closely to a balancing test, where the Court will disregard a transaction if its
purpose of tax avoidance greatly outweighs any other business purpose.
Although controversial, and maybe even a bit contradictory, Gregory
v. Helvering is still good law. We therefore proceed with the analysis of
stock option deductions under the business purpose doctrine and the
substance over form doctrine. Under the business purpose doctrine, we
look at whether there is any other underlying business purpose to the
transaction and, therefore, whether it should be disregarded.142 The
arguments that can be made as to the business purpose of stock options are
(1) stock option compensation increases employee performance because the
employees are now shareholders as well, thus having a direct monetary
reward from the positive performance of the corporation; and (2) stock
options are a form of non-cash compensation, which alleviates the
corporation of large cash outflows for payroll.
Both arguments can be easily defeated by the existence of statutory (or
qualified) stock options distributed under an incentive plan. Unlike
nonqualified stock options, qualified stock options cannot be exercised
before one year from vesting and have a minimum exercise price, thus
reducing excessive speculation and tying compensation even more closely
to performance and employee retention than any nonqualified stock
option.143 Therefore, issuing nonqualified stock options serves no real
business purpose that could not otherwise be equally or better served by a
different type of taxable compensation.
The business purpose of
nonqualified stock options should therefore be disregarded. Conversely, if
a business purpose for these options exists, other than mere tax avoidance,
then such business purpose has a negligible extent when compared to the
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 422 (West 2016).

09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Avoiding Tax Avoidance

5/9/17 8:30 PM

251

tax avoidance benefits provided by the nonqualified stock option
compensation.
The analysis of stock options under the substance over form doctrine is
simpler. The substance over form doctrine is applied particularly to cases
where the transacting entities are closely related.144 In this case, the highly
compensated executives have a very strong connection with the entity
issuing their stock options, although indirectly. Generally, a compensation
committee is employed in determining executive pay. The committee is
composed of, at least in part, corporate insiders.
Therefore, the
compensation committee has a close relationship to the corporation, since
corporate employees are on the committee. Further, the compensation
committee also has a close relationship to the executives whose pay it is
assessing because those executives have the authority to fire the insiders on
the committee. Stock option compensation, as the name suggests, is
compensation. As previously stated, stock options are subject to FICA and
FUTA, and they become part of the ordinary income of the taxpayer when
they are exercised, just like any other form of compensation. Therefore,
stock options should be treated as any other compensation and taxed when
earned.
2. How to Assess Tax Liability
The problem with taxing stock options like a salary is that, unlike a
salary, the value of the option cannot always be readily ascertained.145
Specific provisions in the C.F.R. detail that, unless the option is actively
traded, it is difficult to ascertain the value of the option and, therefore, the
tax owed.146 The option has a value beyond the difference between the
exercise price and the market value of the underlying asset. The option’s
value must also include a premium for the right of the holder to exercise the
option when it is preferred.147 The reason nonqualified stock options have a
special tax regime is because they do not have a readily ascertainable

144
“The substance-over-form doctrine is invoked by the government with greatest success with
respect to transactions between related persons, since, in these circumstances, form often has minimal, if
any, nontax consequences and particular forms are often chosen solely to reduce taxes.” BORIS I.
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS: ¶ 4.3
PERVASIVE JUDICIAL DOCTRINES 9 (2016).
145
26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7 (2016).
146
26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(2) (2016) sets out a presumption, whereas, if the stock option is not
actively traded on a public market, its value is determined to be “not readily ascertainable.” If the
taxpayer wished to rebut the presumption, instead of taking advantage of this statutorily granted taxdeferral tool, he would have to prove that the option meets the four criteria described in the statute.
147
26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (2016).

09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

252

5/9/17 8:30 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 12:225

market value.148
However, a possible solution to the problem would be making an
estimated tax payment when the option is issued. The estimated tax
payment would be based on the market price minus the exercise price.
When the option is actually exercised the taxpayer can make an adjustment
to his tax: (1) if the spread between exercise price and market price has
increased, the taxpayer will make an additional tax payment; and (2) if the
spread between exercise price and market price has lowered since the date
of issue of the option, the taxpayer will receive a refund. This system
would eliminate the benefit of tax deferral to the individual because the
income from the option is taxed as the option is issued.
In order to obtain this result, relevant language in the C.F.R. must be
amended. The relevant C.F.R. sections are lengthy and therefore not
reported in this article, which will include only the proposed amendments,
with modifications to the original language in bold and a comment.
Proposed Amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and (b).
(a) In general. If there is granted to an employee or
independent contractor (or beneficiary thereof) in
connection with the performance of services, an option to
which section 421 (relating generally to certain qualified
and other options) does not apply, section 83(a) shall apply
to such grant if the option has a readily ascertainable fair
market value (determined in accordance with paragraph (b)
of this section) at the time the option is granted. [If the
option does not have a readily ascertainable market
value at the time the option is granted, the person who
performed such services realizes compensation in the
year the option is granted in the amount equal to the
value of the option (determined in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section)]. If section 83(a) does not
apply to the grant of such an option because the option does
not have a readily ascertainable fair market value at the
time of grant, sections 83(a) and 83(b) shall apply at the
time the option is exercised or otherwise disposed of, even
though the fair market value of such option may have
become readily ascertainable before such time. If the
option is exercised, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the
transfer of property pursuant to such exercise, and the
148

26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7 (2016).
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employee or independent contractor realizes compensation
upon such transfer at the time and in the amount
determined under section 83(a) or 83(b). If the option is
sold or otherwise disposed of in an arm’s-length
transaction, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the transfer of
money or other property received in the same manner as
sections 83(a) and 83(b) would have applied to the transfer
of property pursuant to an exercise of the option. The
preceding sentence does not apply to a sale or other
disposition of the option to a person related to the service
provider that occurs on or after July 2, 2003. For this
purpose, a person is related to the service provider if—
(1) The person and the service provider bear a
relationship to each other that is specified in section
267(b) or 707(b)(1), subject to the modifications that
the language “20 percent” is used instead of “50
percent” each place it appears in sections 267(b) and
707(b)(1), and section 267(c)(4) is applied as if the
family of an individual includes the spouse of any
member of the family; or
(2) The person and the service provider are engaged in
trades or businesses under common control (within the
meaning of section 52(a) and (b)); provided that a
person is not related to the service provider if the
person is the service recipient with respect to the option
or the grantor of the option.
[If the person who performed services realizes a
gain (or loss) from the exercise, sale, or disposal of
the option, and such gain (or loss) has not been
accounted for in the year the option was granted,
then such gain (or loss) shall become part of the
person’s income in the year the gain (or loss) is
realized.]
(b) Value of the option
(1) Actively traded on an established market. Options
have a value at the time they are granted, but that value
is ordinarily not readily ascertainable unless the option
is actively traded on an established market. If an

253
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option is actively traded on an established market, the
fair market value of such option is readily ascertainable
for purposes of this section by applying the rules of
valuation set forth in § 20.2031-2.
(2) Not actively traded on an established market.
When an option is not actively traded on an established
market, its fair market value for purposes of this
section shall be equal to the excess of
(i) the fair market value of the asset underlying
the option, over
(ii) the exercise price of the option.
The value of the asset underlying the option
shall be ascertained for purposes of this section
by applying the rules of valuation set forth in §
20.2031-2.
(3) Option Privilege. [. . .] Repealed.149
Comment to Proposed Amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and
(b).
This proposed amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and (b)
introduces the proposed taxation methodology to reduce the impact of tax
deferral on stock option compensation. The new language in subsection (a)
provides a definite scenario for the cases in which the option does not have
a readily ascertainable market value; the very same scenario that created the
problem of tax-deferral in the original statute. The proposed amendment
provides explicitly that in such cases the person receiving the option in lieu
of cash compensation has to include the value of the option in its taxable
income for that year.
The proposed new language in this section imposes a duty on the
taxpayer to report the income derived from the stock option immediately,
regardless of whether the option is exercised. This measure imposes a
rather burdensome requirement on the taxpayer, who has to make a tax
payment on unearned income in the majority of cases where the stock
option is not exercised in the same year it is granted; if the option was, in
fact, exercised when granted, there would be no tax-deferral benefit.
Although burdensome, this measure is necessary to eliminate the tax saving
derived from deferral of taxation on stock options, which is substantial at
the highest income brackets. Further, it is an established practice of

149

Id.
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corporate-America to highly inflate the equity portion in executive
compensation packages, leaving the immediately taxable cash portion to a
minimum.150 The proposed amendment, which introduces an immediate tax
liability for the option-holder, will likely have the collateral benefit of
discouraging excess equity compensation.
The last sentence in amended subsection (a) provides for the
adjustment in the year of exercise or disposal of the option. This language
is a catch-all safety net, which provides for any other possible scenario in
which the option-holder disposes of the option, realizing either a gain or a
loss. Although it is still possible to obtain a tax-deferral benefit in case the
value of the asset underlying the option increases in value over time, such
effect is reduced from the tax deferral resulting from the previous version of
the statute.
Subsection (b) has undergone more substantial changes.
The
subsection heading has been changed to “value of the option” to mirror the
language in amended subsection (a). The language of (b)(1) is substantially
the same, as it does not affect stock options granted to individual
executives. These options, as discussed in the relevant sections above, have
certain restrictions on alienability and cannot be publicly traded on an
established market.
The language of (b)(2) is radically different. The proposed language
now provides an explicit valuation formula in the cases where the option is
not publicly traded. The proposed valuation is simply the difference
between exercise price and the value of the asset underlying the option. In
the case at bar, one share of stock of the corporation, which is granting the
option. This formula presents another problem, however, which is the
determination of the value of the asset underlying the option. The problem
is solved by the immediately subsequent sentence providing for valuation in
accordance with 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2.
26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2 could potentially be applied to two
different scenarios. First, a scenario where the option is not traded on an
established market, but the underlying asset is. Second, a scenario where
neither the option nor the underlying asset are traded on an established
market. If the option is not traded on an established market, but the
underlying asset is, the valuation of the option with the proposed formula is
150
From a cursory review of the literature and quantitative data on the matter, it appears that the
CEO’s of large U.S. corporations have a compensation package that highly favors equity compensation.
Data extrapolated from S.E.C. filings reveal the equity-to-cash ratio for these executives can be
anywhere from 2:1 to almost 50:1. See generally Browse Executive Salaries, Bonuses, Stock Grants,
Stock Options and Other Compensation, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/Executive-Salaries/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2016) (analyzing data from selected S.E.C. filings to graphically represent the
compensation breakdown of executives of large publicly traded corporations). The corporations
selected by the author were Oracle, Wal-Mart, and Bank of America.
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extremely simple. The fair market price of the underlying asset is given by
the average of the highest and lowest selling price on the valuation date,151
and the exercise price of the option is determined by the option contract
itself. This scenario is by far the most common because, generally, only
larger corporations issue stock options. The corporate entities with the need
of employing complex compensation arrangements involving stock options
usually meet the capitalization threshold required to be publicly listed on an
established market. However, smaller corporations, not publicly listed, may
issue stock options; which takes us to the second scenario where neither the
option nor the underlying asset are publicly traded.
In this case, 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2 provides a series of
acceptable calculation methods, which can be used to estimate the value of
the asset in question. If bid and ask prices for the underlying stock are not
available, the calculation will be based on a series of factors, which include
the net worth of the corporation, its predicted earning power, dividendpaying capacity, and other factors, such as market outlook, etc.152 It will
appear to the reader, at first glance, that these calculation techniques are not
exact, but rather aim at providing a best-guess estimate of the value of the
stock. The valuation of a company that is not publicly traded is part science
and part dogmatic mystery, even for the connoisseurs.153 Nonetheless, the
value of the proposed amendment lies in its inverse proportionality between
error and transaction size.
When a corporation begins its activities, it is hardest to value it
because there is no historical data to base the predictions on. However, a
corporation in its infancy is the least likely to grant stock options to its
executives. Even in the extremely unlikely case in which a stock option
was granted at this early stage, and the calculations of value of the
underlying asset were far from its real value, the overall size of the
transaction would probably be negligible. In sum, even if the formula
provides for approximate results in small-business type transactions, the
error in valuation would have only a minimal impact on the taxpayer. This
is because of at least two factors. First, the value of the option is likely to be
small. Second, the executives of such a small business are more likely to be
in lower tax brackets, thus reducing the effect of tax deferral offered by the
151

26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2016).
26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(f) (2016).
153
The problem of valuation of not-yet publicly traded corporations is well-known even to large
financial conglomerates. As a vivid example of this problem, Facebook’s stock valuation was off by
almost 30% when compared to the market’s actual perception of the value of the stock. Corporate
banking giant Morgan Stanley was behind the valuation, and, despite its history and expertise on the
matter, it made a multi-billion-dollar mistake in valuation. David Weidner, Facebook IPO, Facts,
Fiction, and Flops, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023
04821304577436873952633672.
152
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stock option. As the corporation grows, so does the historic data on which
the value predictions can be made. As the likelihood of granting stock
options increases, their value increases, and so does the potential for tax
deferral. However, the precision of calculation of the value of the
underlying asset also increases, making the model more reliable. As the
potential for tax deferral increases, so does the robustness of this valuation
model.
Proposed Amendment to I.R.C. Section 83(h).
(h) Deduction by employer. In the case of a transfer of
property to which this section applies or a cancellation of a
restriction described in subsection (d), there shall be
allowed as a deduction under section 162, to the person for
whom were performed the services in connection with
which such property was transferred, an amount equal to
the amount included under subsection (a), (b), or (d)(2) in
the gross income of the person who performed such
services. Such deduction shall be allowed for the taxable
year of such person in which or with which ends the
taxable year in which such amount is included in the gross
income of the person who performed such services.
[In the case of a transfer of property governed by 26
C.F.R. § 1.83-7, the employer granting the option shall
be allowed a deduction under § 162 in the year when the
option is exercised, sold, or disposed of, by the recipient
of the option. Such deduction under § 162 shall be equal
to the total income realized by the recipient of the
option with the exercise, sale, or disposal thereof.]154
Comment to Proposed Amendment to I.R.C. § 83 (h).
The proposed amendment to Section 83 seeks to modify the existing
language of the statute to better reflect the changes proposed in the earlier
sections. The aim of this amendment is to allow the employer of the
recipient of the stock option to make appropriate business expense
deductions; both in the year when the option is granted, as well as in the
year when the option is exercised by the employee.

154

I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 2016).

09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

258

5/9/17 8:30 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 12:225

However, this proposed amendment does not fix one of the main
problems of stock option deductions; the fact that the corporate entity gets
to make a business deduction for a non-cash expense. As mentioned in the
earlier sections of the article, this is a sort of a “freebie” to the corporation,
which deducts as a business expense something that is not really an
expense, but rather only an opportunity cost. However, the deduction of
non-cash items is an issue that is somewhat accepted in accounting with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Another common example of a
non-cash expense that can be deducted under current tax law is
depreciation.155 The I.R.C. even provides for accelerated depreciation
schedules, which allow the taxpayer to effectively defer income tax.156
Interestingly enough, the depreciation schedule provided for by the I.R.C.
are so fictional, and so clearly geared towards tax avoidance, that in most
cases they have absolutely no reference to the actual useful life of the
assets. For example, long-lived assets like heavy-duty oil drilling
equipment, or airplanes, have a book life of five years.157 But, a discussion
of non-cash deductions is beyond the scope of this article, and it will not be
addressed here.
CONCLUSION
The I.R.C. is an incredibly complex body of law, and the discussion of
any tax issue or reform, even if successful, is just a drop in the ocean.
However, the ocean is made of little drops of water, and tax reform needs to
start somewhere. This article discusses two of the problems affecting
corporate taxation in the United States, with a particular focus on excessive
corporate tax avoidance.
Corporate tax avoidance is unfair and inequitable under multiple points
of view. First, excessive tax avoidance affects the quality of the
investments; “poisons” the corporate decision-making process; and biases
corporate decisions towards tax-exempt investments, investments abroad,
earnings retention, and excessive debt levels. Second, excessive tax
avoidance creates differences between similarly-situated taxpayers with
different access to the income defense industry. Third, because tax
avoidance is more effective as the size of the enterprise increases, it defeats
the purpose of a progressive tax system by leaving most of the tax burden
on the “middle” earners. Lastly, excessive tax avoidance directly reduces
the effectiveness of the tax system, and of the economy at large, because

155
156
157

I.R.C. § 168 (West 2016).
Id.
Id.

09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Avoiding Tax Avoidance

5/9/17 8:30 PM

259

more resources are allocated towards tax avoidance, and the authorities
have a high cost of enforcement to ensure compliance with overly complex
regulations.
The article focused on corporations, and on the most common
practices of tax-avoidance employed by corporate giants like Apple, Inc.
and Yahoo!, transfer pricing and stock option deductions. Transfer pricing
is a three-headed beast. It is generally employed as a base-erosion and
profit shifting mechanism using goods, I.P., or capital. The article
discussed possible solutions to the problem of transfer pricing, and
suggested international regulation that addresses the principle of arm’slength dealing. However, transfer pricing is the result of different tax
regimes in the different countries of the world, the direct and inevitable
result of sovereignty. While detailed accounting may make it more difficult
for a corporation to deliberately engage in transfer pricing, heightened
reporting requirements alone are not likely to resolve the problem.
Although utopian, the true solution to transfer pricing is the complete
harmonization of the tax systems of the world. Until that day, the only real
solution for the U.S. economy is becoming a more competitive tax
jurisdiction in a global market arena where tax-havens and black-listed
nations provide an overly friendly environment to tax-avoiding MNEs.
On the other hand, stock option deductions are a tax-deferral
instrument created by a loophole in the legislation. A nonqualified stock
option allows the individual to book substantial savings on tax deferral, and
it allows the corporation to deduct a non-cash expense similar to
depreciation. This article seeks to close this tax loophole by applying
known doctrines of judicial interpretation, as well as proposing amended
statutory language. The aim of this article is to strike a balance and treat
nonqualified stock options like other regular cash compensation in order to
eliminate the benefits the stock options confer to the holder through tax
deferral. This article is far from being the definitive panacea to the ailments
of the U.S. tax system. However, this article does illustrate how relatively
small changes to the wording of relevant I.R.C. and C.F.R. provisions can,
consistently with legal precedent, resolve or mitigate the problem of
excessive tax avoidance.

